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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of mistaken assumptions enables courts to treat as unen-
forceable agreements that have been entered into on the basis of
erroneous assumptions concerning the context of the agreement in
question where enforcement of the agreement would inflict an
injustice on one of the parties. The law of mistaken assumptions
is to be distinguished from cases of misunderstanding where the
parties have failed to reach an adequate consensus ad idem.' The
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. This is the
revised version of a paper presented by the author at the 33rd Annual Workshop on
Commercial and Consumer Law held at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto on
October 17 and 18, 2003.
1. Although various terms are used by different writers to refer to the various cate-
gories of mistake that may affect a transaction, there is a broad consensus that there
exists a basic division between mistakes that prevent formation of the agreement,
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classic illustration of misunderstanding is Raffles v. Wichelhaus,2 in
which the parties contracted to buy and sell 125 bales of cotton on
board the ship "Peerless". Unfortunately, the parties had different
ships "Peerless" in mind. As a result, no consensus ad idem had been
reached and the agreement was not enforceable. In a mistaken
assumptions case, on the other hand, the parties reach agreement on
the terms of their contract but share an error with respect to some
important contextual circumstance. The parties might not appreci-
ate, for example, that goods that are the subject-matter of a sale had
been destroyed by fire prior to the entering into of the agreement. In
determining whether an agreement should be considered unenforce-
able by reason of the mistaken assumption that infects its creation,
courts must engage in a delicate exercise of balancing the competing
values of contractual stability and the provision of relief in cases of
severe injustice.
Students of contract well know that the leading English deci-
sions in the law of mistaken assumptions are the 1932 decision of
the House of Lords in Bell v. Lever Brothers3 and the 1949 decision
in the Court of Appeal in Solle v. Butcher.' In the latter case,
Denning L.J. famously sought to confine the common law doctrine
of mistaken assumptions articulated in Bell v. Lever Brothers,
which rendered agreements void on the basis of mistaken assump-
tions, and supplement it, or, indeed, to some extent supplant it by
an equitable doctrine of mistaken assumptions which would render
agreements voidable on the same or similar grounds. For admirers
of Lord Denning, this is one of his more attractive and successful
contributions to the evolution of contracts jurisprudence. For his
detractors, this was perhaps yet another typical exercise in historical
here referred to as "misunderstandings" and mistakes concerning some matter rele-
vant to the decision to enter the agreement, here referred to as "mistaken assump-
tions". In some contexts, the two categories are referred to, respectively, as mistakes
as to "terms" and mistakes as to "motive". See, e.g., Calgary (City) v. Northern
Construction Co., [19861 2 W.W.R. 426, 42 Alta. L.R. (2d) 1,67 A.R. 95 (Alta. C.A.),
affd [19871 2 S.C.R. 757, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 193, 56 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193. Some have
adopted Lord Atkin's terminology of mistakes that "nullify" as opposed to those that
"negative" consent, the former being cases of mistaken assumptions, the latter being
misunderstandings. See Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd., [1932] A.C. 161 (H.L.). For an
illuminating discussion of classification questions, see G. Palmer, Mistake and
Unjust Enrichment (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1962), ch. 1.
2. (1864), 2 H. & C. 906, 159 E.R. 375.
3. Supra, footnote 1.
4. [1950] 1 K.B. 671 (C.A.).
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revisionism and inappropriately muscular reform of the private law
of obligations.
In Great Peace Shipping Ltd. v. Tsavliris Salvage (International)
Ltd.' the English Court of Appeal was afforded an opportunity to
reconsider mistaken assumptions doctrine more generally and, in
particular, the tension between Bell v. Lever Brothers and Solle v.
Butcher. As will be seen, the Court of Appeal in this case decided
to reject what some would consider to be the improvements to the
doctrine effected by Solle v. Butcher and to restore the doctrine to
that envisaged by Lord Atkin in Bell v. Lever Brothers. It will be
argued here that this is a most unfortunate development and one that
ought not be followed by Canadian courts. In order to support this
thesis, it will be necessary to consider briefly the history of com-
mon mistaken assumptions doctrine in English law and it will be
helpful, in my view, to provide a brief account of American law on
this topic before turning to a more detailed account of and critique
of the decision in The Great Peace.
II. MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS AT COMMON LAW
As we shall see, much controversy surrounds the common law
doctrine rendering contracts void on the basis that the agreement in
question has been entered into by the parties on the basis of a com-
mon and mistaken assumption concerning a material fact.
Nonetheless, it is clear that relief in this form is available in two
classes of cases. The first, referred to as res extincta, holds agree-
ments for the sale of goods void in circumstances where the parties
are unaware that the goods had ceased to exist at the time of con-
tracting. The most frequently cited illustration of this proposition
is Couturier v. Hastie,6 a case holding void a contract for the sale
of a cargo of corn which, unbeknownst to the parties, had ceased to
exist at the time of contracting. This common law doctrine was
enshrined by Sir MacKenzie Chalmers7 in the English sale of
goods legislation! Relief would not be available, however, if the
seller had explicitly or implicitly warranted the existence of the
5. [2002] 4 All E.R. 689 (C.A.) (hereafter The Great Peace).
6. (1856), 5 H.L.C. 673, 10 E.R. 1065.
7. M. Chalmers, Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 2nd ed. (London, W. Clowes and Sons, 1894),
p. 17.
8. Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (U.K.), 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, s. 6, a provision repeated in the
sale of goods legislation in the common law provinces of Canada and in other
Commonwealth jurisdictions. See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 1, s. 7.
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goods. The second category, cases of res sua, are those in which a
purchaser later discovers that at the time of contracting he or she
already owned the subject-matter of the sale. Such agreements are
also void at common law. Interestingly, the authority most fre-
quently cited for this proposition is in fact a decision of a court of
equity. In Cooper v. Phibbs,9 a lease of a fishery was set aside on
the ground that the lessee, at the time of entering the lease, was
already entitled to an equitable life estate in the property. As we
shall see, the precise significance to be attached to the equitable
nature of this authority has been a matter of some controversy.
Nonetheless, it appears to be well accepted that, in a case of res sua,
the contract is void at common law.
Beyond these two categories, the scope of the common law doc-
trine has been, and indeed remains, rather unclear. Certainly, how-
ever, common law courts have held agreements void in a range of
circumstances beyond those of res extincta and res sua. The diffi-
culty lies, however, in articulating the basis on which other types of
circumstances will ground a holding that the agreement is void for
mistake. The various versions of the requirements articulating the
test for operative mistake may be characterized as being either nar-
row or broad. Though the narrow versions of the test appear more
restrictive or difficult to apply than the broader and seemingly
more flexible versions, it may well be that the precise nature of the
test will not be dispositive of the outcomes in particular cases. The
narrow conception of the common law doctrine is applicable only
where, by way of extension of the doctrine of res extincta, it can be
said that the "subject-matter" of the agreement "ceases to exist"
because of a mistake. In Strickland v. Turner," for example, it was
held that the purchase of an annuity where the annuitant was in fact
already dead at the time of sale was void. This result can be
explained on the basis that the subject-matter of the agreement -
an annuity on the life of a living person - had ceased to exist at
the time of contracting.
A similar explanation can be offered for Scott v. Coulson," a case
in which the sale of a life insurance policy on the life of one A.T.
Death was held void when it was discovered that, by the time of
contracting, Death had in fact died. The value of the policy was thus
9. (1867), L.R. 2 H.L. 149.
10. (1852), 7 Ex. 208, 155 E.R. 919.
11. [1903] 2 Ch. 249 (C.A.).
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very different from what the parties had initially assumed. If one
defines the subject-matter of the agreement to be "a life insurance
policy on the life of a living person", the agreement could be held
void on the basis that that subject-matter did not exist at the time of
contract. 2 Similarly, in the colourful and much taught American
case of Sherwood v. Walker,3 the sale of a cow, Rose 2d of Abalone,
which, although assumed by the parties to be barren, was with calf
at the time of contracting, could be held to be void on the basis that
the subject-matter of the agreement, a barren cow, did not exist at the
time of entering the agreement. In reply, of course, it would be
argued that the subject-matter of the contract is a cow or, indeed,
Rose 2d herself. As these decisions illustrate, the "non-existence of
the subject-matter" test is a highly manipulable one. One can art-
fully characterize the subject-matter of the contract in such a way as
to either deny relief or make it available. The test thus offers little
guidance as to when the common law doctrine will apply.
Other judges tend to articulate a broader test in terms that stress
the "basic" or "fundamental" nature of the mistake in question.
Thus, in Scott v. Coulson itself, Vaughan Williams L.J. explained
the result on the basis that
both parties entered into this contract upon the basis of a common affirma-
tive belief that the assured was alive; but as it turned out that this was a com-
mon mistake, the contract was one which cannot be enforced. This is so at
law ... if the basis which both parties recognised as the basis is not true.
14
Romer L.J. reasoned that the defendant
must be taken to have known that the basis upon which the contract had been
entered into, and the common belief upon which both parties had acted, did
not exist. That was a circumstance which went to the root of the matter, and
rendered it improper to insist upon the completion of the contract.' 5
Although Romer L.J.'s reference to the fact that the basis for the
agreement did not exist shows traces of the non-existence of the
subject-matter test, the emphasis placed on the mistake being
required to be one with respect to a matter that forms the basis of the
agreement appears somewhat broader than the subject-matter test.
12. Such an explanation of the result in Scott v. Coulson was offered by Greer L.J. in the
Court of Appeal decision in the leading case of Bell v. Lever Brothers. See sub nom.
Lever Bros Ltd. v. Bell, [1931] 1 K.B. 557 at p. 595.
13. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. S.C., 1887).
14. Supra, footnote 11, at p. 252.
15. Ibid., at p. 253.
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A similar approach was taken by Blackburn J. in Lord Kennedy
v. Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co.,6 a case
involving a purchase of shares on the basis of a prospectus that
falsely stated that the company had secured an attractive agreement
with the government of New Zealand to provide mail services.
Blackburn J. articulated the test for holding the agreement void for
mistake in the following terms:
the difficulty in every case is to determine that the mistake or misapprehen-
sion is as to the substance of the whole consideration, going, as it were, to the
root of the matter, or only to some point, even though a material point, an
error as to which does not effect the substance of the whole consideration. 7
Applying this test to the circumstances of the case, Blackburn J.
concluded that although the mistake had formed a material part of
the motive for applying for the shares, the mistake did not prevent
the shares from "being in substance those [the plaintiff] applied
for". 8 These broader tests in terms of fundamental error may be
supported on the basis that they are more flexible in the sense that
they avoid the verbal manipulations inherent in the narrower tests.
On the other hand, they may be thought to suffer from an unattrac-
tive degree of generality or vagueness.
On the basis of such authorities, then, the doctrine of mistaken
assumptions at common law had obviously remained in a rather
unsatisfactory state. There appears to have been no clear consen-
sus as to the nature of the test to be applied. Moreover, the reason-
ing in the cases does not provide a convincing explanation for
either the granting or the withholding of relief. The difference
between Strickland v. Turner and Lord Kennedy's case appears to
be that the purchaser in the latter case assumed the risk that the
description of the company's business in the prospectus might not
be perfectly accurate, whereas the purchaser in the former case did
not assume the risk that the annuity being purchased might be val-
ueless. The one fact that appears to be common to the actual cases
granting relief is that the mistaken assumption has led to a drastic
miscalculation of the value being acquired by one of the parties to
the agreement. However, considerations such as these, while no
doubt present to the minds of the judges deciding these cases,
found no explicit basis in the articulated tests for determining that
16. (1867), L.R. 2 Q.B. 580 (Q.B.).
17. Ibid., at p. 588.
18. Ibid., at p. 589.
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the contracts are void from mistake at common law. The mistake
must relate to the existence "or substance" of the subject-matter of
the contract or, in some sense, to a matter which is the "basis" of
the agreement into which the parties have entered. Such was the
unsatisfactory state of the law prior to the decision of the House of
Lords in the leading case of Bell v. Lever Brothers.9
III. BELL V LEVER BROTHERS
In this famous case, Lever Brothers had entered into agree-
ments to terminate the employment contracts of two senior
employees in order to facilitate a proposed reorganization of the
employer's corporate structure. As it was the employer's view that
the employees had both provided valuable services, the arrange-
ments reached were generous in nature. When, howev&r, after
receiving the moneys, one of the employees disclosed that they
had both been trading in cocoa on their own account, Lever
Brothers sought to set aside the agreements on the basis that had
it been aware of the circumstance, the employees could have been
dismissed for cause. At trial, the jury held that although this mis-
conduct had not been present to the minds of the employees at the
time of negotiating the agreements, Lever Brothers, on the other
hand, if it had been aware of these circumstances, would have
exercised its right to dismiss the employees summarily and with-
out compensation. At trial, Wright J., as he then was, quoted with
approval" the test articulated by Blackburn J. in Lord Kennedy's
case 21 and held that the mistake went to the substance of the whole
consideration and that the agreement was either void at common
law or could be set aside in equity. In the Court of Appeal, howev-
er, both the narrow and the broader versions of the test attracted
some support. Scrutton L.J. framed the test in terms of a mistake
that relates to "the continuance of a particular state of things [that]
is in the contemplation of both parties fundamental to the validity
of the contract".22 He suggested, however, that the application of
the test could be expressed either as an implication of the term in
19. Supra, footnote 1. For a detailed examination of the factual circumstances of the case
see C. MacMillan, "How Temptation Led to Mistake: An Explanation of Bell v. Lever
Brothers Limited" (2003), 119 L.Q.R. 625.
20. Supra, footnote 12, at p. 566.
21. Quoted in the text at footnote 17.
22. Supra, footnote 12, at p. 584.
[Vol. 40
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the agreement or as the application of an "assumed foundation"
test. He explained as follows:
One may describe the result as either that the contract is void because of an
implied term that its validity shall depend on the existence at the time of the
contract, and during its term of performance, of a particular state of facts, or
(which is only another way of putting the proposition) that there is a mutual
mistake of the parties, who make the contract believing that a particular foun-
dation to it exists, which is essential to its existence, a fundamental reason for
making it. In either case the absence of the assumed foundation makes the
contract void.
23
This suggestion that the doctrine can be formulated in the alter-
native form of an implied term was to be taken up by Lord Atkin
in the House of Lords. The other members of the Court of Appeal
flatly contradicted each other on the relevance of the non-existence
of the subject-matter test. Greer L.J. conceded that "[i]t is quite
true that in nearly all, if not all the cases, in which an agreement
has been held void from mutual mistake, the mistake has been one
as to the existence of the subject matter or its identity".24 He went
on, however, to observe that "it is not, in my judgment, the law that
the only mutual mistakes that will avoid an agreement are mistakes
as to the existence or identity of the subject matter of the con-
tract".25 For Greer L.J., the mistake must be "as to the fundamental
character of the subject matter of the contract"26 or "as to some fact
which affects the fundamental basis of the contract".27 Lawrence
L.J., on the other hand, offered the view that "the present case falls
within that general class of cases where the subject matter of a con-
tract has been held to be non-existent". 8 All members of the Court
of Appeal were, however, satisfied that the test had been met on the
present facts and that the appeal should be dismissed.
On further appeal to the House of Lords, however, the appellants
enjoyed success. The leading opinion of Lord Atkin appears to adopt
what might be considered a variation of the narrower version of the
test. Lord Atkin began with a survey of the existing doctrine con-
cerning cases of res extincta and res sua, characterizing the former
as a "mistake as to the existence of the subject-matter" 9 and the
23. Ibid., at p. 585.
24. Ibid., at p. 595.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., at p. 596.
28. Ibid., at p. 590.
29. Supra, footnote 1, at p. 218.
2004]
54 Canadian Business Law Journal
latter as "mistake as to title". 0 In such cases, he stated, the agree-
ment is "void" rather than "voidable". Neither category of these
cases being applicable to the facts at hand, Lord Atkin went on to
consider the doctrine applicable to a case where the mistake relates
to the quality of the subject-matter of the agreement rather than its
existence or ownership. He reasoned as follows:
Mistake as to quality of the thing contracted for raises more difficult ques-
tions. In such a case a mistake will not affect assent unless it is the mistake
of both parties, and is as to the existence of some quality which makes the
thing without the quality essentially different from the thing as it was
believed to be.
3'
Although this test moves away from the literal language of the
"non-existence of the subject-matter" test, the movement is not
dramatic. Under Lord Atkin's test, one must establish not that the
subject-matter fails to exist but rather that it has become something
essentially different from what it was believed to be. Like the non-
existence of the subject-matter test, however, Lord Atkin's new ver-
sion of the test appears to be a highly manipulable one. A pregnant
cow is essentially different, one could say, from a barren cow.
Indeed, as we shall see, Lord Atkin's opinion itself offers some evi-
dence of this feature of the test.
Curiously, having apparently opted for a narrow version of the
test for operative mistake, Lord Atkin then introduced a note of
ambiguity in his opinion by embracing the more open-textured
approach adopted in the Court of Appeal by Scrutton L.J. Like
Scrutton L.J., Lord Atkin suggested that there was an "alternative
mode of expressing the result of a mutual mistake".32 Drawing sup-
port from the now discredited implied contract theory of frustration
doctrine, Lord Atkin indicated his agreement with the following
proposition formulated by counsel:
Whenever it is to be inferred from the terms of a contract or its surround-
ing circumstances that the consensus has been reached upon the basis of a
particular contractual assumption, and that assumption is not true, the con-
tract is avoided: i.e., it is void ab initio if the assumption is of present fact
and it ceases to bind if the assumption is of future fact.
33
In Lord Atkin's view, few would disagree with this statement, but
he cautioned that care must be taken with the meaning of the terms
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., at p. 224.
33. Ibid., at p. 225, quoting Sir John Simon.
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"basis" and "contractual assumption". In determining whether a
particular assumption is a condition of a contract, Lord Atkin
quoted from the "important judgment of Scrutton L.J. in the pres-
ent case"34 and found the expressions "[i]n the contemplation of
both parties fundamental to the continued validity of the contract"
and "a foundation essential to its existence" to be helpful.35 A third
phrase employed by Scrutton L.J., "a fundamental reason for mak-
ing it", could, in Lord Atkin's view, be "misleading", as one's
motive for entering into an agreement could be mistaken in some
respect without giving rise to a finding that "the new state of facts
makes the contract something different in kind from a contract in
the original state of facts".36 Moreover, such a term is not to be
implied unless it was necessary to do so in order to give, in the
language of the traditional test for implying terms, "business effi-
cacy to the transaction".37 Oddly, then, Lord Atkin appears at one
and the same time both to adopt the broader language of the test
formulated by Scrutton L.J. in the Court of Appeal and, as well, to
equate that test to what appears to be the narrower test of requiring
the mistake to be of such nature that the contract itself is different
in kind from the contract as initially contemplated.
The narrow versions of the test articulated by Lord Atkin thus
appear to include the initial suggestion that the mistake is as to a
"quality that makes the thing without the quality essentially differ-
ent from the thing as it was believed to be",38 a test which appears
to apply to the subject-matter of the agreement, and the later sug-
gestion that the mistake must make the agreement itself "different
in kind".39 It may or may not be that these versions are intended by
Lord Atkin to be overlapping or indeed co-extensive. Although the
two tests appear to be applied interchangeably by Lord Atkin, no
guidance on this point is forthcoming. In any event, the difficulty
one encounters in applying the latter version of the test is manifest
in the following passage from Lord Atkin's opinion:
Is an agreement to terminate a broken contract different in kind from an
agreement to terminate an unbroken contract, assuming that the breach has
given the one party the right to declare the contract at an end? I feel the
34. Ibid., at p. 226.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. (emphasis added).
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., at p. 218.
39. Ibid., at p. 226.
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weight of the plaintiffs' contention that a contract immediately determinable
is a different thing from a contract for an unexpired term, and that the differ-
ence in kind can be illustrated by the immense price of release from the
longer contract as compared with the shorter. And I agree that an agreement
to take an assignment of a lease for five years is not the same thing as to take
an assignment of a lease for three years, still less a term for a few months.
But, on the whole, I have come to the conclusion that it would be wrong to
decide that an agreement to terminate a definite specified contract is void if
it turns out that the agreement had already been broken and could have been
terminated otherwise. The contract released is the identical contract in both
cases, and the party paying for release gets exactly what he bargains for.4"
One can sympathize with the sentiment that applying the "differ-
ence in kind" test to the facts of Bell v. Lever Brothers is in the nature
of a tough call. Indeed, it may be that whatever test is employed to
determine the scope of operative mistake, its application to the facts
of Bell v. Lever Brothers will involve a difficult decision.
Nonetheless, the real problem with the "difference in kind" test is
not that it is difficult to apply but rather, that it does not raise for con-
sideration the criteria or factors that appear to be relevant to the
choice to be made.
The real dilemma confronted by the court in Bell v. Lever
Brothers is to determine whether or not the risk of the kind of error
that occurred should be considered to have been assumed by an
employer in the context of negotiating a termination agreement.
One could justify the result in Bell v. Lever Brothers on the basis
that generally, employers negotiating such agreements should
make whatever enquiries they deem fit prior to entering such an
agreement and that, in the absence of fraud or other misleading
conduct by the employees, employers should be considered to have
taken the risk that their enquiries were inadequate. Once the agree-
ment has been entered, the time for such enquiries has passed. As
a general matter, employers are aware of the risk of such errors and
one could reasonably hold that the risk of inadequate inquiry is
assumed by the employer in these circumstances.
Alternatively, if so general a proposition was found unattractive
by the deciding court, the result in Bell v. Lever Brothers could be
justified on the basis that on the particular facts, the employer's
generosity in recognizing the valuable contribution made by these
particular employees led the employer effectively to waive proper
enquiries and make what, in retrospect, may appear to be, in effect,
40. Ibid., at p. 223-24.
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a somewhat foolhardy gift. In such circumstances, again, the risk of
error may be considered to have been assumed by the employer. In
any event, the important point for present purposes is that it is con-
siderations such as these that are plainly relevant to the making of
the decision in this case. Yet they are not directly required or indeed
even encouraged to be considered by the "difference in subject-mat-
ter" or "different in kind" test.
Whether one finds Lord Atkin's analysis satisfactory or not, how-
ever, it can fairly be said that his opinion is not free of ambiguity.
In particular, it is not entirely clear what role Lord Atkin had in
mind for a formulation of the test adverting to mistaken assump-
tions "fundamental to the continued validity of the contract"."
Greater clarity cannot be easily purchased by examining the other
opinions written in this case. The panel divided three to two and can
be fairly described as having reached no definitive conclusion on
the precise nature of the test for operative mistake. Thus, Lord
Thankerton, who concurred with Lord Atkin, found attractive the
analysis offered in Lord Kennedy's case and articulated the nature
of the requisite mistake as being with respect to a matter that the
parties "accepted in their minds as an essential and integral element
of the subject-matter [of the contract]". 42 The third member of the
majority, Lord Blanesburgh, was content to decide the case on the
basis that "mutual mistake had not been pleaded". 3 In dissent, Lord
Warrington, with whom Viscount Hailsham concurred, offered a
further definition of operative mistake, indicating that the error
must be "of such a fundamental character as to constitute an under-
lying assumption without which the parties would not have made
the contract they in fact made"' and concluded that the actual error
in Bell v. Lever Brothers "was as fundamental to the bargain as any
"45error one can imagine".
In summary, then, it would not appear to be correct to suggest
that Lord Atkin's "difference in the subject-matter" or "difference in
kind" test clearly expressed the opinion of the House of Lords on
this occasion. Although it is perhaps true to state that the majority
appeared to share Lord Atkin's preference for a narrow test, his
particular articulation of it does not appear to be plainly adopted by
41. Ibid., at p. 226.
42. Ibid., at p. 235.
43. Ibid., at p. 189.
44. Ibid., at p. 208.
45. Ibid.
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either a majority of the panel or, indeed, by any other member of the
panel. Apart from Lord Blanesburgh, the other members of the
panel appeared to prefer a more flexible formula of the kind offered
in Lord Kennedy's case by Blackburn J. Perhaps it is not surprising,
then, that many editions of Anson on Contract have offered the view
that "where the parties contract under a false and fundamental
assumption, going to the root of the contract, and which both of them
may be taken to have had in mind at the time they entered into it as
the basis of their agreement, the contract may be void".46
IV. MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS IN EQUITY: SOLLE V BUTCHER
In 1949, in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Solle v.
Butcher,17Denning L.J. was afforded an opportunity to consider the
effect of Bell v. Lever Brothers and the role played by the mistak-
en assumptions doctrine in the equitable context. The opportunity
was seized with apparent relish. In essence, Denning L.J. offered a
restrictive interpretation of the scope of the common law mistake
doctrine and suggested that a more flexible doctrine for setting
aside agreements on the basis of mistaken assumptions was avail-
able in equity. Denning L.J.'s summary of the effect of Bell v. Lever
Brothers was as follows:
The correct interpretation of that case, to my mind, is that, once a contract has
been made, that is to say, once the parties, whatever their inmost states of
mind, have to all outward appearances agreed with sufficient certainty in the
same terms on the same subject-matter, then the contract is good unless and
until it is set aside for failure of some condition on which the existence of the
contract depends, or for fraud, or on some equitable ground. Neither party can
rely on his own mistake to say it was a nullity from the beginning, no matter
that it was a mistake which to his mind was fundamental, and no matter that
the other party knew that he was under a mistake.48
It is evident that Denning L.J. is here giving the narrowest possi-
ble interpretation of the effect of Bell v. Lever Brothers. The only
justification for so narrow a reading in the opinions in that case is to
be found, of course, in Lord Atkin's suggestion that, unless the mis-
take makes the contract or its subject-matter different in kind from
the original contract or its subject-matter, the mistake is inoperative.
46. See, e.g., J. Beatson, Anson's Law of Contract, 28th ed. (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 319.
47. Supra, footnote 4.
48. Ibid., at p. 691.
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If, notwithstanding the mistake, the subject-matter of the contract
remains the same or the kind of contract remains the same, Lord
Atkin appears to suggest that the contract must be binding. Hence
the arguable legitimacy of Denning L.J.'s suggestion that if the
parties agree "in the same terms on the same subject-matter", 4 the
common law doctrine is inapplicable.
Applying this test to the facts of Solle v. Butcher, the common
law doctrine was, in Denning L.J.'s view, inapplicable. Solle and
Butcher had collaborated on the renovation of a building owned by
Butcher containing five flats. Acting on Solle's advice that the ren-
ovations were of a sufficient extent to render the rent control leg-
islation inapplicable, Butcher rented one of the flats to Solle at a
rental rate considerably in excess of that which would otherwise
have been permissible under the legislation. If applicable, the leg-
islation would have obliged Butcher to comply with the necessary
statutory formalities for the increase in prior rent. After a falling
out between the parties, Solle took the position that the legislation
did in fact apply and that he had been charged an unlawful amount
of rent under the agreement. In due course, it was held that the leg-
islation did, in fact, apply. The parties had thus entered the lease
under a common mistake as to their respective rights under the rent
control legislation. Though the error was induced by Solle, the
error was innocent on his part in the sense that he had received pro-
fessional advice on the point before passing on this view to
Butcher. For Denning L.J., common law mistake doctrine did not
apply in such circumstances. Although the lease may have been
entered into on the basis of a shared assumption concerning a fun-
damental matter, nonetheless the parties had agreed in the same
terms on the same suject-matter and the lease was therefore
enforceable at common law.
For Denning L.J., however, that was not the end of the matter. He
then turned to "consider mistakes which render a contract voidable,
that is, liable to be set aside on some equitable ground". 0
Controversially, Denning L.J. asserted that there existed a well estab-
lished equitable jurisdiction to set aside agreements that were
enforceable at common law. Drawing support from the res sua case,
Cooper v. Phibbs,5' Denning L.J. claimed that a court of equity
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., at p. 692.
51. Supra, footnote 9.
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could relieve for common mistake "so long as it could do so with-
out injustice to third parties .. . whenever it was of opinion that it
was unconscientious for the other party to avail themselves of the
legal advantage which he had obtained".52 Denning L.J. indicated
that the notion of what would be considered "unconscientious" had
developed over time and he summarized various grounds for setting
aside agreements in equity, adding to this list a doctrine of equitable
mistake in the following terms:
A contract is also liable in equity to be set aside if the parties were under a
common misapprehension either as to facts or as to their relative and respec-
tive rights, provided that the misapprehension was fundamental and that the
party seeking to set it aside was not himself at fault.
53
This doctrine was available to the tenant in the present case. Indeed,
in Denning L.J.'s view, the injustice of allowing the tenant to take
advantage of the mistake which he had, albeit innocently, induced
was so obvious that if the rules of equity were so rigid that they
could not remedy such an injustice, "it is time we had a new equity
to make good the omissions of the old" but fortunately, in his view,
"the established rules are amply sufficient for this case". 4
There are two particularly controversial features of this reason-
ing. First, it is sometimes said that Denning L.J.'s reading of the
common law doctrine is unduly restrictive.5 Second, it is some-
times argued that historically there simply was no separate definition
of operative mistake in equity and that Denning L.J.'s assertion in
this regard is simply false.56 As we shall see, these criticisms of
Denning L.J.'s reasoning came to preoccupy the Court of Appeal in
its recent decision in The Great Peace.57 For the moment, however,
it should be noted that Denning L.J. was not reticent about his rea-
sons for wanting to constrain or, indeed, replace common law mis-
take doctrine with an equitable version of the rule. In Denning L.J.'s
view, the common law doctrine was unsatisfactory from a policy
prospective as it created a potential for severe injustice for third par-
ties who innocently acquired for value the subject-matter transferred
52. Solle v. Butcher, supra, footnote 4, at p. 692.
53. Ibid., at p. 693.
54. Ibid., at p. 695.
55. See, e.g., Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd. v. Crdit du Nord SA, [ 1989]
1 W.L.R. 255 at p. 267, [1988] 3 All E.R. 902 per Steyn J.
56. See, e.g., C. Slade, "The Myth of Mistake in Contract" (1954), 70 L.Q.R. 385; W.E.D.
Davies, "Mistake in Equity: Solle v. Butcher Re-examined" (1969), 3 Man. L.J. 79.
57. Supra, footnote 5.
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by the initial void contract. This point was spelled out quite plainly
in the following terms:
In order to see whether the lease can be avoided for this mistake it is neces-
sary to remember that mistake is of two kinds: first, mistake which renders the
contract void, that is, a nullity from the beginning, which is the kind of mis-
take which was dealt with by the courts of common law; and, secondly, mis-
take which renders the contract not void, but voidable, that is, liable to be set
aside on such terms as the court thinks fit, which is the kind of mistake which
was dealt with by the courts of equity. Much of the difficulty which has
attended this subject has arisen because, before the fusion of law and equity,
the courts of common law, in order to do justice in the case in hand, extended
this doctrine of mistake beyond its proper limits and held contracts to be void
which were really only voidable, a process which was capable of being attend-
ed with much injustice to third persons who bought goods or otherwise com-
mitted themselves on the faith that there was a contract.
As an illustration of the harmful effects of the common law doc-
trine Denning L.J. referred to Cundy v. Lindsay,59 the famous mistake
of identity case, in which an innocent third-party purchaser of the
subject-matter of the original sale was held liable in conversion to
the original seller for its value. Equity, on the other hand, would pro-
tect the bonafide purchaser for value in such a case by withholding
the remedy of rescission from the initial purchaser. The fusion of law
and equity, in Denning L.J.'s view, made it possible to reverse this
historical process of extending inappropriately the doctrines of the
common law. Accordingly, at common law "only those contracts are
now held void in which the mistake was such as to prevent the for-
mation of any contract at all".'
From a policy perspective, these views appear to be undeniably
sound. Void for mistake is simply a bad idea and its restriction in
Solle v. Butcher is surely a welcome development. Moreover, the
constraint of void for mistake is an approach that has surfaced in
other contexts. Thus, in Saunders v. Anglia Building Society,6' the
House of Lords restricted the reach of the doctrine of non estfac-
turn by holding that one who is careless in signing a document can-
not rely on that defence. Again, the concern motivating the adjust-
ment in the doctrine is plainly that of protecting innocent third
party purchasers of the subject-matter of the original agreement.
The effect of confining the availability of the defence leaves the
58. Supra, footnote 4, at pp. 690-91.
59. (1878), 3 App. Cas 459 (H.L.).
60. Supra, footnote 4, at p. 691.
61. [1971] A.C. 1004 (H.L.).
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victim of the misleading conduct to equitable rescissionary reme-
dies, with the result that the bona fide third party purchaser is pro-
tected. Similarly, in the context of mistake of identity, the decision
of the English Court of Appeal in Lewis v. Averay62 restricts the scope
of the common law mistake of identity rule, thereby leaving the mis-
taken party to equitable rescissionary relief. In these contexts, as
well, then, transactions that were originally treated as void at com-
mon law are now to be considered valid at common law but unen-
forceable in equity. These developments appear inescapably to rep-
resent progressive development of English mistake doctrines.
The remedy fashioned by Denning L.J. in Solle v. Butcher is also
controversial. Purporting to rely on the flexibility in fashioning
rescissionary remedies said to be manifest in Cooper v. Phibbs,
Denning L.J. conditioned rescission on a willingness of the land-
lord to offer a lease for the unexpired portion of the term at the rate
that could have been secured by compliance with the rent control
legislation, and further, on the condition that the tenant would pay
a fair and economic rent for the occupation of the premises enjoyed
thus far. Bucknill L.J. agreed with the terms of the proposed order
but, apart from observing that he had read Denning L.J.'s reasons,
offered no view on the nature of the relationship between common
law and equitable mistake doctrine. Jenkins L.J. dissented on the
ground that the mistake was one of law and that an error of this
kind could not be the foundation for the right to rescind.
In assessing the significance of Denning L.J.'s opinion in Solle
for purposes of English and Canadian common law, then, one must
examine the reception accorded to his views in subsequent English
and Canadian decisions, a matter to which we will shortly turn.
Before doing so, however, it will be useful to indicate briefly the
limitations of Denning L.J.'s analysis and, having done so, turn to a
brief account of American law concerning common mistaken
assumptions. The strength of Denning L.J.'s opinion in Solle v.
Butcher is its effect in restricting the scope of the common law doc-
trine of void for mistake and supplanting it with an equitable doc-
trine that affords protection to the interests of innocent third parties.
Indeed, it is not obvious that Denning L.J., at least, would apply
common law doctrine beyond the well established categories of res
extincta and res sua, these being cases, it should be noted, in which
62. [1972] 1 Q.B. 198 (C.A.). The validity of this approach has recently been affirmed by
the House of Lords. See Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson, [2003] UKHL 62.
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true owner claims against a third party do not typically arise. Non-
existent goods are not likely to be resold to a third party who would,
in any event, not take possession of the goods. Goods already
owned by the purchaser can, of course, be successfully transferred
for value to third parties.
The weakness of the opinion, however, is that it appears to offer
very little guidance with respect to the test for operative mistake to
be applied in equity. Beyond the suggestion that there must be a
"common and fundamental misapprehension" either as to facts or as
to relative and respective rights, the opinion offers virtually no guid-
ance as to the factors to be taken into account to determine whether
or not such a misapprehension is present in a particular fact situation.
In order to develop a sense of the kinds of guidelines that could be
articulated, it will be useful to consider briefly the American
jurisprudence on these issues.
V. THE AMERICAN LAW AT A GLANCE
For a brief account of the American law on common mistaken
assumptions, there can be no better source than the relevant sections
of the Restatement of Contracts, Second.63 The basic rule is set out
in § 152.
§ 152. When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a Contract Voidable
(1) Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a
basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on
the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the
adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mistake under the rule
stated in § 154.
(2) In determining whether the mistake has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances, account is taken of any relief by way of refor-
mation, restitution, or otherwise.'
The key criteria for application of the test set out in the first
subparagraph, then, are, first, that the mistake has had a "material"
affect on the agreed exchange of performances and second, that the
adversely affected party does not bear the risk of the error that has
occurred. The suggestion that the effect of the error on the
exchange need only be "material" may alarm English and, perhaps,
63. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Contracts (St. Paul,
American Law Institute Publishers, 1981).
64. Ibid, at p. 385. See also E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, 2nd ed. (New
York, Aspen Publishers Inc., 1998), vol. 2, at pp. 569-82.
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Canadian readers as it may be taken to suggest that relief may be
available in circumstances where the error need not be in some
sense "basic or fundamental". It must be remembered, however,
that "material" appears to have a significantly different meaning
in American contract law than it does, say, in the Anglo-Canadian
law of misrepresentation. Thus, what might be referred to in the
Anglo-Canadian system as a "repudiatory breach" of contract
entitling the innocent party to terminate the agreement and sue for
damages is referred to in American law as a "material" breach.65
Similarly, in the context of §152, the Commentary to § 152 states:
The mere fact that those parties are mistaken with respect to ... an assump-
tion [with respect to an existing fact] does not, of itself, afford a reason for
avoidance of the contract by the adversely affected party. Relief is only
appropriate in situations where a mistake of both parties has such a material
affect on the agreed exchange of performances as to upset the very basis for
the contract .... It is not enough for [the affected party] to prove that he
would not have made the contract had it not been for the mistake. He must
show that the resulting imbalance in the agreed exchange is so severe that he
can not fairly be required to carry it out.
As § 152(1) indicates, the requirement that the adversely affect-
ed party does not bear the risk of the error in question is further
explicated in § 154:
§ 154. When a Party Bears the Risk of a Mistake
A party bears the risk of a mistake when
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but
treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable
in the circumstances to do SO.
6 7
Subsections (a) and (b), it might be said, identify situations where
the affected party may reasonably be held to an understanding that
the risk has been assumed. Subparagraph (c), however, is appar-
ently intended to deal with situations where, although an inference
of this kind is unwarranted, the circumstances are nonetheless such
that the affected party ought to be held to have assumed the risk of
error. The illustrations of this last proposition offered in the
65. Supra, footnote 63, at p. 215 (Section 237, "Effect on Other Party's Duties of a Failure
to Render Performance"). See also Farnsworth, ibid., at pp. 487-99.
66. Ibid., at p. 386.
67. Ibid., at pp. 402-03.
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Restatement would not alarm or, indeed, surprise an English or
Canadian reader. Thus, Illustration 3 offers a variation of Scott v.
Coulson and suggests that the annuitant is not dead at the time of
contracting but, rather, suffers from an incurable, fatal disease.6" In
such a case, the illustration concludes, a court would hold that the
purchaser had assumed the risk of that kind of error. Other illustra-
tions indicate that contractors will be taken to have assumed the risk
that subsoil conditions are such as to render a construction contract
more expensive to complete 69 or that increased costs resulting from
a contractor's mistaken estimate of the amount of labour required
increase the cost to complete a particular project."
More generally, the illustrations to these two sections of the
Restatement, in my view at least, would not look unfamiliar to an
English or Canadian reader. The illustrations are based on
American and, to some extent, English decisions and, of course, a
particular reader may or may not agree with the outcome of a par-
ticular case. Nonetheless, the more important point for present
purposes - and this occasions no surprise in the context of
material that has fallen from the pen, initially at least, of Allan
Farnsworth" - is that the test set forth in the Restatement appears
to hit the nail more cleanly on the head than the kinds of tests
articulated thus far in the English and Canadian cases. If one
revisited the facts of Bell v. Lever Brothers under §§ 152 and 154,
one would be directed to consider whether the error led to a
material effect on the exchange, which is undoubtedly the case, but
one would then be directed to consider what, in my view, is the
critical issue in Bell v. Lever Brothers, which is whether an
employer either generally or on the particular facts of this case
should be taken to have assumed the risk of error resulting from
what might be considered to be the inadequate investigation con-
cerning the performance of the particular employees. As intimated
above, I would suggest that the decision in Bell v. Lever Brothers
can be defended on the basis that the risk of such errors was
indeed assumed by Lever Brothers.
Finally, it should be noted that the Restatement and the under-
lying American doctrine appears to support the type of remedial
68. Ibid., at p. 405.
69. Ibid., Illustration 4.
70. Ibid., Illustration 6.
71. Farnsworth served as a Co-Reporter of the Restatement of Contracts, Second and
assumed principal responsibility for chapter 6, which includes §§ 152 and 154.
3-40 C.B.L.J.
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flexibility asserted by the English Court of Appeal in Solle v.
Butcher. Thus, Illustration 3 to § 152 reads:
A contracts to sell and B to buy a tract of land. B agrees to pay A $100,000 in
cash and to assume a mortgage that C holds on the tract. Both A and B believe
that the amount of the mortgage is $50,000, but in fact it is only $10,000. The
contract is voidable by A, unless the court supplies a term under which B is
entitled to enforce the contract if he agrees to pay an appropriate additional
sum, and B does so .... 72
If the court of equity is restricted to either granting or withhold-
ing rescission, the unattractive result in such a case is that either the
contract will be enforced as is, with resulting unjust enrichment of
the purchaser B who pays 40% less than anticipated for the land,
or the contract is rescinded, in which case B is unfairly deprived of
the opportunity to purchase the property at the agreed price. The
ability of the court to condition rescission upon the enabling of B
to enforce the agreement by paying the additional $40,000 provides
a solution about which neither A nor B can reasonably complain.
VI. CANADIAN AND ENGLISH RECEPTION OF SOLLE V BUTCHER
The equitable mistake doctrine articulated by Denning L.J. in
Solle v. Butcher appears to have been accepted into the fabric of
Canadian contract law and, at least prior to the decision in The
Great Peace, into the fabric of English law as well. Although it is
true that in English law a number of the early decisions involved
Lord Denning himself, the doctrine has now been applied on a num-
ber of occasions and most recently by decisions of the Court of
Appeal in which Lord Denning played no part. In Grist v. Bailey,"
an agreement for the sale of land was set aside by Goff J., as he then
was, on the basis that the parties had erroneously believed that the
land was subject to an existing tenancy. Free of the tenancy, the
land was worth more than double the contract price. In Magee v.
Pennine Insurance Co.,74 an agreement of compromise under which
an insured paid a claim under an accident insurance policy was set
aside on the ground that the parties shared an erroneous belief that
the policy was valid and binding. In Laurence v. Lexcourt Holdings
Ltd.,75 a long-term lease of property for use as business premises
72. Supra, footnote 63, at p. 387.
73. [1967] 1 Ch. 532, [1966] 2 All E.R. 875.
74. [1969] 2 Q.B. 507, [1969] 2 All E.R. 891 (C.A.).
75. [1978] 2 All E.R. 810, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1128 (Ch. D.).
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was set aside as the parties had failed to appreciate that the zoning
permitted this use of the premises only for the first two years of
the term. In Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd. v.
Credit du Nord S.A., 76 a guarantee of a debt secured by a sale and
leaseback of non-existent goods was held void at common law on
the basis that the res extincta analogy was a close one. Steyn J., as
he then was, went on to observe that "[t]oday it is clear that mis-
take in equity is not circumscribed by common law definitions. A
contract affected by mistake in equity is not void but may be set
aside on terms."77 Further, Steyn J. indicated that if it was incor-
rect to hold the guarantee void at common law, he would have con-
sidered it to be voidable in equity. For Steyn J. "a narrow doctrine
of common law mistake (as enunciated in Bell v. Lever Bros. Ltd.),
supplemented by the more flexible doctrine of mistake in equity (as
developed in Solle v. Butcher and later cases), seems to me to be an
entirely sensible and satisfactory state of the law . . .,,"
Interestingly, Steyn J. further observed that before setting aside an
agreement either at law or in equity, one must first consider
"whether the contract itself, by express or implied condition
precedent or otherwise, provides who bears the risk of the relative
mistake".79
The importance of risk allocation analysis was also emphasized
by Hoffmann L.J., as he then was, in William Sindall Plc v.
Cambridgeshire County Council0 in which the Court of Appeal
refused to apply the equitable doctrine, which it assumed to be well
established, to set aside a sale of land for development purposes
where the parties had failed to appreciate the existence of a sewer
running under the land. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the exis-
tence of an express term subjecting the transaction to easements
precluded application of equitable mistake doctrine. Within the
past few years, the existence of the doctrine has been assumed in
two decisions of the English Court of Appeal" and a decision at
trial.82
76. Supra, footnote 55.
77. Ibid., at p. 266.
78. Ibid., at pp. 267-68.
79. Ibid., at p. 268
80. [1994] 3 All E.R. 932, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1016 (C.A.).
81. Nutt v. Read (1999), 32 H.L.R. 761 (C.A.); West Sussex Properties Ltd. v. Chichester
DC, [2000] All E.R. (D) 887 (C.A.).
82. Clarion Ltd v. National Provident Institution, [2000] 2 All E.R. 265 (Ch.).
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Although the list of Canadian decisions applying the equitable
doctrine is not as lengthy, the correct view would be that the doc-
trine has been accepted as a feature of Canadian law.83 One of the
leading cases, Toronto Dominion Bank v. Fortin,' like Magee v.
Pennine Insurance Co., applies the doctrine to an agreement of
compromise. In the Canadian case, the agreement of compromise
was held to be voidable on the ground that the agreement was based
on a common and erroneous assumption concerning the validity of
the initial claim. The court distinguished, quite correctly, a decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada which enforced a compromise
based on a similar mistaken assumption where, however, the parties
had each sought legal advice on the very issue in question. In other
cases, the doctrine was held applicable to circumstances where the
parties to a real estate transaction mistakenly assumed that the prop-
erty was twice as large as it in fact was,85 where it was discovered
that the monthly payments agreed upon in the context of the long-
term agreement for the purchase and sale of land and chattels
would never retire the balance the purchase price,86 and where, in
the context of a real estate transaction, the parties had mistakenly
believed that a dwelling house was located on the lot in question.87
Prior to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in The Great
Peace," then, to which we will now turn, one would have opined
rather confidently in both England and in common law Canada that
the equitable mistake doctrine articulated in Solle v. Butcher was a
recognized feature of the law. In passing, it is of interest to note
that in virtually all of these English and Canadian cases, literal per-
formance of the contract remained possible. Thus, if one were to
83. See, e.g., McMaster University v. Wilchar Construction Ltd. (1971), 22 D.L.R. (3d)
9 at pp. 18-19, [1971] 3 O.R. 801 (H.C.), affd 69 D.L.R. (3d) 400n, 12 O.R. (2d) 512n
(C.A.). See also Vandekerhove v. Litchfield (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 739,, [1994] 1
W.W.R. 596, 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 252 (S.C.), revd on other grounds 121 D.L.R. (4th)
571, [1995] 4 W.W.R. 575, 1 B.C.L.R. (3d) 70, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 126
D.L.R. (4th) vii, 111 W.A.C. 160n; Stellar Properties Ltd. v. Botham Holdings Ltd.,
[1994] 8 W.W.R. 639, 66 W.A.C. 185, 94 B.C.L.R. (2d) 42 (C.A.). And see, S.M.
Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 4th ed. (Aurora, Canada Law Book, 1999), pp. 276-
281 and 288-91; G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto,
Carswell, 1999), pp. 276-78.
84. (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 232, [1978] 5 W.W.R. 302, 27 C.B.R. (N.S.) 232 (B.C.S.C.).
85. Hyrsky v. Smith (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 385, [1969] 2 O.R. 360 (Ont. H.C.).
86. Ivanochko v. Sych (1967), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 474, 58 W.W.R. 633 (Sask. C.A.).
87. Marwood v. Charter Credit Corp. (1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 563, 2 N.S.R. (2d) 743
(C.A.).
88. Supra, footnote 5.
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attempt to apply to these cases the version of the doctrine articu-
lated by Lord Atkin in Bell v. Lever Brothers, it would be necessary
to manipulate the concept of the "subject-matter of the contract" in
each case in order to be able to conclude that the subject-matter of
the contract was different from that assumed because of mistake.
Such arguments could be made, of course, with varying degrees of
artificiality in these various fact situations.
VII. THE GREAT PEACE
In The Great Peace," both the trial judge and the Court of
Appeal had occasion to reconsider the existence of the equitable
jurisdiction to avoid agreements on the basis of mistaken assump-
tions articulated by Denning L.J. in Solle v. Butcher. The trial
judge, Toulson J., reached the "bold conclusion"90 that the views
expressed by Denning L.J. in Solle were incorrect. In Toulson J.'s
view, equity simply did not possess a jurisdiction to set aside agree-
ments on such grounds. The Court of Appeal agreed with these
views and concluded that the equitable jurisdiction invoked by
Denning L.J. and by subsequent English courts was a mere
"chimera".9' The lengthy reasons offered by the Court of Appeal for
this conclusion offered a detailed analysis of the history of mistak-
en assumptions doctrine, placing considerable emphasis on a
detailed dissection of the reasoning in Bell v. Lever Brothers and
Solle v. Butcher itself. After briefly describing the reasons provided
for the Court of Appeal by Lord Phillips M.R., a critique of the deci-
sion and its implications for English law will be offered.
The facts of the case are uncomplicated. En route from Brazil to
China, a vessel, The Cape Providence, suffered serious structural
damage with consequent risk to both the vessel and its crew. The
defendant salvor was retained to provide assistance. The defendant
sought assistance from a third party, Marint, in locating a tug. When
it appeared that the tug would only be available in five or six days,
Marint was asked to try to locate another vessel in the vicinity of The
Cape Providence that might be prepared to offer assistance with the
evacuation of the crew, should that become necessary. Marint
advised that The Great Peace, a vessel owned by the plaintiffs, was
the vessel closest to the current location of The Cape Providence and
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., at p. 692, per Lord Phillips M.R.
91. Ibid., at p. 723.
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that it should be able to rendezvous with The Cape Providence in
about 12 hours. Acting on the instructions of The Cape Providence,
the defendant commenced negotiations with the plaintiff for suitable
arrangements by which The Great Peace would alter its course and
proceed to the location of The Cape Providence. Within a few hours,
such arrangements were reached and The Great Peace altered its
course. The arrangements included a term permitting the defendant
to cancel the agreement on payment of a minimum five-day fee.
Within a few hours, it became apparent that The Great Peace
was actually 410 miles, rather than the initially estimated 35 miles,
away from The Cape Providence. At this point, the defendants
advised Marint that they were expecting to cancel The Great Peace
but would not do so yet, as they wished to determine whether a
closer vessel could be identified. Shortly thereafter, having learned
that The Cape Providence had been passed by a vessel called the
Nordfarer, the defendants contracted with the owners of the
Nordfarer for similar assistance and instructed Marint to cancel the
arrangements with the plaintiffs. Marint then confirmed the can-
cellation and indicated that it would recommend, in the circum-
stances, the payment of a lesser cancellation fee of two days' hire.
The defendants were unwilling, however, to pay any sum at all to
the plaintiff with respect to the cancellation of the agreement.
In response to the plaintiff's claim for the five-day cancellation
fee payable under the agreement, the defendants argued, both at
trial and in the Court of Appeal, that the agreement had been
entered into on the basis of a shared fundamental assumption that
The Great Peace was "in close proximity" 92 to The Cape Providence
whereas, in fact, she was not. Accordingly, the agreement was
either void at common law or, at least, voidable in equity and sub-
ject to rescission. These defences were rejected both at trial and on
appeal and the claim enjoyed success. On behalf of the Court of
Appeal, Lord Phillips M.R. began his reasons with a careful exam-
ination of the reasoning at all levels in Bell v. Lever Brothers. Lord
Phillips quoted at particular length from the opinion of Lord Atkin,
which he considered to represent a consensus of the majority of the
panel. Lord Phillips observed that the matter had been considered
both at common law and in equity at trial and further, that Lord Atkin
had indicated that the result in Cooper v. Phibbs,9 the principal
92. Ibid, at p. 696.
93. Supra, footnote 9.
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authority upon which Denning L.J. had relied upon as evidence of
the existence of an equitable jurisdiction, should have been that the
agreement was void at common law rather than voidable in equity.
Accordingly, Lord Phillips suggested that Denning L.J.'s conclu-
sion in Solle v. Butcher that the House of Lords in Bell v. Lever
Brothers had simply not considered the possible application of an
independent equitable jurisdiction to relieve for mistake was simply
"not realistic".'
With particular reference to Denning L.J.'s reliance on Cooper
v. Phibbs, Lord Phillips accepted the view advanced by Matthews 95
that it might well have been a case in which a contract valid at
common law was rescinded in equity for mistake. 96 The plaintiff's
perceived need to resort to equity may have rested on the ground
that the plaintiff's life estate was equitable in nature and might well
not have been recognized by a court of common law. Nonetheless,
the type of mistake that the court appeared to recognize in Cooper
v. Phibbs as providing a basis for rescission was an instance of res
sua in which a party agrees to purchase a title that he already owns.
The court was merely applying the common law doctrine of res sua
to the purchase of an equitable interest. The width of the jurisdic-
tion in equity would not therefore appear to be remarkable. Further,
Lord Phillips quoted passages from the opinions in Norwich Union
Fire Insurance Society Ltd. v. Wm. H. Price Ltd.97 in support of the
proposition that in Bell v. Lever Brothers, the House of Lords had
equated "the test of common mistake in Cooper v. Phibbs with one
that renders a contract void at common law".98 Accordingly, it was
simply "not correct to state that Cooper v. Phibbs as interpreted by
Denning L.J. was 'in no way impaired by Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd.' or
that it had been 'fully restored' by Norwich Union"."
Lord Phillips then turned to consider the various subsequent
decisions of the lower courts and of the Court of Appeal which pur-
ported to follow and apply Solle v. Butcher. The collective support
offered by those authorities for the notion that the doctrine of Solle
v. Butcher had become a recognized proposition of English law
was undermined by Lord Phillips on three grounds. First, on a
94. Supra, footnote 5, at p. 722.
95. P. Matthews, "A Note on Cooper v. Phibbs" (1989), 105 L.Q.R. 599.
96. Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 715-18.
97. [1934] A.C. 455 at pp. 462-63, [1934] 3 D.L.R. 529 (H.L.).
98. Supra footnote 5, at p. 723.
99. Ibid., at p. 722.
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careful parsing of the decisions, it was his view that these cases do
not "define satisfactorily different qualities of mistake, one operating
in law and one in equity". 'I The subsequent cases "have merely
emphasized the confusion of this area of our jurisprudence".'
0 '
Further, Lord Phillips observed, "If coherence is to be restored to
this area of our law, it can only be by declaring that there is no juris-
diction to grant rescission of a contract on the ground of common
mistake where the contract is valid and enforceable on ordinary
principles of contract law."'0 2
Second, Lord Phillips appeared to offer some scepticism with
respect to the appropriateness of the results in at least some of the
subsequent cases. There was, in his view, a common factor in Solle
v. Butcher and in the later cases in that the "effect of the mistake has
been to make a contract a particularly bad bargain for one of the
parties".0 3 Lord Phillips appeared sceptical as to whether equity had
adopted a principle which would enable equitable rescission in cir-
cumstances where the common law has produced this result.
Indeed, it appears to have been his view that an equitable doctrine
correcting the common law in this respect would be an inappropri-
ate exercise of the historical jurisdiction of equity. The proper scope
of equity is merely to "supplement or mitigate" the common law.
The inappropriate effect of Solle v. Butcher was to say that Bell v.
Lever Brothers was wrongly decided."°
Third, it was his view that the difficulties with Solle v. Butcher
had not been fully canvassed in the decisions that appear to accept
its legitimacy. He concluded as follows:
In this case we have heard full argument, which has provided what we
believe has been the first opportunity in this court for a full and mature con-
sideration of the relation between Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd and Solle v. Butcher.
In the light of that consideration we can see no way that Solle v. Butcher can
stand with Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd. In these circumstances we can see no
option but to so hold. 05
In the view of Lord Phillips, the fact that the Court of Appeal had
itself purported to apply the doctrine on previous occasions did not
preclude a holding to this effect.
100. Ibid., at p. 728.
101. Ibid., at p. 729.
102. Ibid., at p. 729.
103. Ibid., at p. 728.
104. Ibid., at p. 729.
105. Ibid., at p. 730.
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If the equitable doctrine is thus dispatched, it must be asked what
version of the common law doctrine would, in the view of the Court
of Appeal, remain in place. The answer is that the common law doc-
trine of mistaken assumption is perceived by the Court of Appeal in
The Great Peace as being very restrictive in nature. Lord Atkin's
views did not escape unscathed. Thus, Lord Phillips questioned
whether there was a solid jurisprudential basis for the "quality of
the subject-matter" test fashioned by Lord Atkin."° It was Lord
Phillips' view that a surer footing could be found in analogous prin-
ciples in the law of frustration. Thus, after a review of the evolution
of frustration doctrine from its origins in implied contract theory to
the more modem statement in the Davis Contractors case, 7 he con-
cluded: "The avoidance of a contract on the ground of common
mistake results from a rule of law under which, if it transpires that
one or both of the parties have agreed to do something which it is
impossible to perform, no obligation arises out of that agree-
ment."'0 8 Thus building on a rather restrictive view of the doctrine
of frustration, Lord Phillips articulated the test for operative mis-
take at common law in the following terms:
the following elements must be present if common mistake is to avoid a
contract:
(i) there must be a common assumption as to the existence of a state of
affairs;
(ii) there must be no warranty by either party that that state of affairs exists;
(iii) the non-existence of the state of affairs must not be attributable to the
fault of either party;
(iv) the non-existence of the state of affairs must render performance of the
contract impossible;
(v) the state of affairs may be the existence, or vital attribute, of the considera-
tion to be provided or circumstances which must subsist if the performance
of the contractual adventure is to be possible.' °9
The conclusion that mistake will be operative only where per-
formance of the contract has become impossible appears to offer
very little scope for the operation of the doctrine. On the other
hand, like the "non-existence of the subject matter" test, it may be
possible to manipulate the concept of the "contractual undertaking"
106. Ibid., at p. 705.
107. Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council, [1956] A.C. 696 (H.L.).
108. Supra, footnote 5, at p. 708.
109. Ibid., at pp. 708-09.
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in such a way as to be able to conclude that although literal per-
formance of the agreement remains possible, performance of the
true "contractual undertaking" has become "impossible". Indeed,
Lord Phillips appears to envisage this sort of manipulation:
In consideration whether performance of the contract is impossible, it is nec-
essary to identify what it is that the parties agreed would be performed. This
involves looking not only at the express terms but at any implications that
may arise out of the surrounding circumstances. In some cases, it will be
possible to identify details of the "contractual adventure" which go beyond
the terms which are expressly spelled out, in others it will not. "
Nonetheless, the narrowness of the conception of common law mis-
take doctrine envisaged by Lord Phillips is underlined by his sug-
gestion that it may be difficult to reconcile Bell v. Lever Brothers"'
with Scott v. Coulson,"2 the case involving the sale of a life insur-
ance policy on a person who, contrary to the parties' assumptions,
was deceased at the time of contracting. In Lord Phillips' view, this
decision is often erroneously treated as being on all fours with
Strickland v. Turner,"3 the case applying mistake doctrine to the
sale of an annuity on the life of a deceased person. The annuity in
Strickland was "self-evidently a nullity","' whereas this could not
be said of the life insurance policy in Scott v. Coulson. Although
Lord Phillips did not explicitly suggest that Scott v. Coulson
should no longer considered to be good law, he suggested that the
decision could only be explained on the basis that "a life policy
before decease is fundamentally different from a life policy after
decease, so that the contractual consideration no longer existed"."5
In such a case, presumably, it may be argued that it has become
"impossible" to perform the contractual undertaking.
Finally, then, it remained for the Court of Appeal to apply this
test to the present facts. Unsurprisingly, the court concluded that
the mistake as to the distance between the two vessels did not
"render the contractual adventure impossible of performance". 116
The fact that the boats were farther apart than first assumed did not
render the services "essentially different" than those originally
110. Ibid., at p. 708.
111. Supra, footnote 1.
112. Supra, footnote 11.
113. Supra, footnote 10.
114. Supra, footnote 5, at p. 711.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid., at p. 730.
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envisaged. Curiously, although the Court of Appeal quoted, with
apparent approval, passages from the judgment of Steyn J. in the
Associated Japanese Bank case " ' and Hoffmann L.J. in William
Sindall Plc"8 to the effect that an appropriate first step in the
analysis of a mistaken assumptions problem is to attempt to deter-
mine whether the parties have allocated the risk of the kind of error
which has occurred to one of them, the Court of Appeal did not
apply this analysis to the facts of this case. Had the Court of
Appeal done so, it may well be that the fact that the parties had
included a termination provision in their agreement which permit-
ted termination by the hirer only upon the payment of five days'
hire might have been considered to have assigned the risk of early
termination to the hirer. In the final paragraph of the judgment Lord
Phillips adverted to the importance of the termination clause in the
following terms:
The parties entered into a binding contract for the hire of the Great Peace.
That contract gave the parties an express right to cancel the contract subject
to the obligation to pay the "cancellation fee" of five-days' hire. When they
engaged the Nordfarer they cancelled the Great Peace. They became liable in
consequence to pay the cancellation fee. There is no injustice in this result."9
It is most unfortunate that the court did not consider whether, in the
light of this provision, the risk of early termination for whatever
reason had been implicitly assigned to the hirer by the agreement.
VIII. CRITIQUE
Although one must concede that there is some truth in the Court
of Appeal's suggestion 20 that in Solle v. Butcher Denning L.J.
attempted to confine the doctrine of mistaken common law as
articulated by Lord Atkin in Bell v. Lever Brothers, the decision in
The Great Peace appears to be an unfortunate one for a variety of
reasons. First, the test for operative mistake defined by the Court
of Appeal in The Great Peace appears unduly restrictive and is
likely, therefore, to lead to the manipulations characteristic of the
earlier narrow versions of the test. Moreover, by failing to address
the very problem identified by Denning L.J. in Solle v. Butcher -
117. Supra, footnote 76, at p. 268, quoted by Lord Phillips supra, footnote 5, at p. 709.
118. Supra, footnote 80 at p. 1035 (W.L.R.), quoted by Lord Phillips supra, footnote 5,
at pp. 709-10.
119. Ibid., at p. 731.
120. Ibid., at p. 722.
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the impact of the common law void for mistake doctrine on the
interests of third parties - the Court of Appeal has breathed
renewed life into a doctrine that is quite unattractive from a policy
perspective. Further, the attempted suppression of the equitable
doctrine carries with it, at least for the purposes of English law, the
suppression of the remedial flexibility afforded by that doctrine.
The result is to leave mistaken assumptions doctrine in a very unsat-
isfactory state as, indeed, the Court of Appeal appears to concede in
this case.'21 Finally, the handling of matters of precedent and the
impression the reader is given of the Court of Appeal's sense of the
appropriate role of an appellate court in dealing with matters of this
kind may appear troubling to some observers. Each of these points
may be briefly addressed in turn.
1. The Test for Operative Mistake: One Step
Forward and Two Steps Back
One of the alleged strengths of the common law is its ability to
renew itself through the modification and improvement of doctrine
over time. Although the rate of change may be more glacial than
meteoric, there can be no doubt that such change does occur.'2
Through time-honoured devices such as the ironing out of anom-
alies,'23 the realignment of rules in closer correspondence to their
underlying rationales'24 and, indeed, in the overruling of doctrine
that has plainly become unsatisfactory as, for example, where the
exceptions to the rule threaten to overwhelm the rule altogether,'25
the common law gradually replaces the flawed insights of earlier
generations of jurists and adjusts to changing social and economic
circumstances. From this perspective, the essential deficiency of
mistaken assumptions doctrine is that it appears to have failed to
121. Ibid., at p. 73 0.
122. For a recent statement to this effect, see Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council,
[1998] 4 All E.R. 513 (H.L.) at p. 534, per Lord Goff.
123. See, e.g., Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas & Co., [1971] S.C.R. 562, 17
D.L.R. (3d) 710, [19721 2 W.W.R. 28.
124. See, e.g., Pao On v. Lau flu Long, [1980] A.C. 614 (P.C.).
125. See, e.g., Air Canada v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161,
[1989] 4 W.W.R. 97. For a brief discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's recent
pronouncements on the exercise of its capacity to overrule prior decisions, see J.D.
McCamus, "The Common Law: Where is it Written Down?", in Y. Gendreau, ed., Le lis-
ible et l'illisible: The Legible and the Illegible (Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 2003) 19
at pp. 28-41.
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articulate its underlying rationale and align the black letter rule to
that underlying set of concerns. American experience'26 strongly
suggests that the competing tensions of contractual stability and
relief for egregious error are best reconciled by attempting to deter-
mine whether the parties have explicitly or implicitly allocated the
risk of error in their agreement'27 and, if not, in considering whether
the presence of error has given rise to a severe and surprising imbal-
ance in the values being exchanged under the affected transaction.
Against this background, the Court of Appeal in The Great
Peace has made a valuable contribution by reaffirming that it is
critical in situations where the possibility of applying mistaken
assumptions doctrine is being considered that a court attempt to
make an assessment of the risk allocation effected by the agreement
itself. Although the Court of Appeal, unhelpfully in my view, has
commingled the risk allocation analysis with the determination of
whether performance has become "impossible",'28 it is nonetheless
an important step forward for the court to assert that it is necessary
to "determine whether on true construction of the contract one or
other party has undertaken responsibility for the subsistence of the
assumed state of affairs".'29 As Steyn J. observed in the Associated
Japanese Bank case, "[i]t is at this hurdle that many pleas of mis-
take will either fail or prove to have been unnecessary". 30 As noted
above, however, it is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal did not
apply this test to the facts of The Great Peace, as it appears that the
existence of a cancellation fee provision provided a satisfactory
basis for inferring that the risk of early termination for whatever
reason was assumed by the hirer.
If this reaffirmation of the importance of risk allocation is an
important step forward, there are other features of the test articu-
lated in The Great Peace that represent the opposite of progress.
Thus, to return to the rigidity of a test that essentially requires one
126. For a brief account of which see the text at footnotes 63-72.
127. This approach has also been advocated by Commonwealth scholars. See, e.g.
Waddams, supra, footnote 83, at pp. 284-85; P.S. Atiyah, "Judicial Techniques and the
English Law of Contract" (1968), 2 Ottawa L. Rev. 337, revised and reprinted as
"Judicial Techniques and the Law of Contract" in P.S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), ch. 9; L.B. McTurnan, "An Approach to Common
Mistake in English Law" (1963), 41 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
128. Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 708-09, quoted in the text at footnotes 108 and 109.
129. Ibid., at pp. 710-11.
130. Supra, footnote 76, at p. 268, quoted by Lord Phillips in The Great Peace, supra,
footnote 5, at p. 709.
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to establish that a performance has become impossible more or less
returns the analysis to one of being required to determine whether
the subject-matter of the contract is no longer in existence, in some
sense, and therefore cannot be delivered. The evidence of the
English and Canadian case law on mistaken assumptions establishes
beyond doubt, I would suggest, that courts are drawn to relieve for
common mistake in circumstances beyond cases of what might be
referred to literally as non-existence of the subject-matter of the
contract. Accordingly, if this is the test that must be met, courts will,
as history indicates, manipulate the concept of "the subject-matter
of the agreement" in such a way as to permit relief. Similarly, if
courts are required to assert that performance has become impossi-
ble, it seems very likely that in a case where relief appears warrant-
ed, a court will find that the nature of the contractual undertaking is
such that its performance has become "impossible".
As noted above, the Court of Appeal appears to envisage this
kind of manipulation by explaining that the nature of the contractu-
al adventure may be determined, in an appropriate case, by looking
beyond the four corners of the agreement to its surrounding cir-
cumstances. 3' A rule that requires artificial analyses of this kind
obfuscates rather than clarifies legal analysis. While an open-textured
rule drawn in terms of "fundamental" or "basic" error may be unap-
pealingly vague, a vague rule that permits the courts to weigh the
relevant factors unimpeded by circumlocution appears to be the
preferable approach. The return in The Great Peace, then, to a
much narrower and restrictive definition of the test thus appears
quite unhelpful.
Further, the suppression by the Court of Appeal of the relevance
of the impact of the error on the values being exchanged appears to
direct the analysis away from what must surely be a relevant crite-
rion or factor.'32 What could one mean by "fundamental" or "basic"
error other than that the error has had a severe or devastating
impact on the equivalency of the exchange? It is ironic, then, as
Daniel Friedmann has observed, that "the element that the parties
(and possibility also the jury) usually consider to be the most
important, is, under the common law, totally irrelevant".'33 As we
131. Ibid., at pp. 708-09, quoted in the text above at footnote 110.
132. Ibid., at pp. 728-29.
133. D. Friedmann, "The Objective Principle and Mistake and Involuntariness in Contract
and Restitution" (2003), 119 L.Q.R. 68 at p. 74.
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have seen, 3 4 American law certainly does not treat this factor as
irrelevant and appears to gain coherence from its willingness to
address this consideration more openly than does English law. In
short, a test along the American lines of requiring first, that the error
not be one the risk of which has been allocated to one of the parties
and, second, that the surprising facts have had a drastic effect on the
values being exchanged is a far better explanation for the granting
of relief than the traditional "non-existence of the subject-matter
test" or the "impossibility of performance" variant proposed in The
Great Peace.
2. New Legs for Void for Mistake
One of the more disappointing features in the reasoning of The
Great Peace is that it simply fails to address the considerations
underlying the shift from common law mistake doctrines to equi-
table mistake doctrines offered by Denning L.J. in Solle v.
Butcher. As indicated above, Denning L.J. plainly indicated that
the point of engaging equitable jurisdiction in place of that of the
common law was to provide protection for innocent third parties
who may have purchased the subject-matter of the original agree-
ment in good faith.'35 If the initial transaction is void at common
law, no property will pass to the original purchaser and the origi-
nal purchaser will fail to pass title on to the third party. Equitable
rescissionary doctrine, on the other hand, will withhold rescission
of the original transaction if doing so is necessary in order to
afford appropriate protection to the interests of the bonafide third-
party purchaser. As noted above, this shift from void at law to
voidable in equity parallels developments in other areas of mistake
doctrine which have also restricted the application of common law
doctrine in order to afford greater protection to third parties. 3 6 In
The Great Peace, the Court of Appeal failed to discuss this issue
and, by reviving the common law doctrine and killing off its
equitable counterpart, the decision in The Great Peace returns to
centre stage the problem of harm being visited on innocent third
parties without justification.
134. See the text at footnotes 63-72.
135. Supra, footnote 4, at pp. 690-91, a passage quoted in the text at footnote 58.
136. See the discussion in the text at footnotes 61-62. Moreover the shift from void to void-
able in the context of mistake of identity has recently been reaffirmed by the House of
Lords in Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson, supra, footnote 62.
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3. The Hardening of the Remedies
In Solle v. Butcher, it will be recalled,3 7 Denning L.J., relying on
Cooper v. Phibbs,'3 s held that the equitable rescissionary decree had
the useful advantage of enabling the court to condition the granting
of rescissionary relief on terms. On the particular facts of that case,
Denning L.J. held that the granting of rescission at the instance of
the landlord ought to be conditioned on the landlord's willingness to
renew the lease to the tenant for the unexpired portion of the term at
the rate that would have been agreed to but for the error. In The
Great Peace, Lord Phillips - again, it must be conceded, with accu-
racy - suggested'39 that no such wide-ranging discretion is manifest
in the order of the court in Cooper v. Phibbs. Indeed, the terms
imposed in that case simply provide for restitutionary recovery of
the value of benefits conferred by each party on the other, a well-
established feature of a rescissionary decree. Restitutionary relief
would also be possible in the context of an agreement that is void at
common law. In principle, the party who has conferred benefits
under a contract for mistake should be entitled to bring a common
law quasi-contractual claim for the value of benefits conferred."
Thus, the proposed termination of the equitable jurisdiction to
relieve for mistake would appear to have the effect, principally, of
cutting off the judicial ability to fashion the kinds of conditions, such
as the required offering of a renewal of the lease, that Denning L.J.
himself imposed in Solle v. Butcher
Again, the Court of Appeal did not direct any attention to the
question of whether or not such remedial flexibility is attractive from
a policy perspective. As noted above, 4' such remedies do appear to
have the capacity of effecting a just result in particular circum-
stances. Moreover, similar remedies have been allowed in the con-
text of rectification claims, especially so in the Canadian cases.' 2
Thus, where an agreement is entered into in circumstances where
137. See the discussion in the text after footnote 62.
138. Supra, footnote 9.
139. Ibid., at pp. 717-18 and 723.
140. See, generally, P.D. Maddaugh and J.D. McCamus, The Law of Restitution, 2nd ed.
(Aurora, Canada Law Book Inc., 2004), ch. 17.
141. See the text at footnotes 72-73.
142. See, e.g. Devald v. Zigeuner (1958), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 285, [1958] OWN. 381 (Ont. H.C.),
relying on, inter alia, Garrard v. Frankel (1862), 30 Beav. 445. Cf Riverlate Properties
Ltd. v. Paul, [1974] 3 W.L.R. 564 (C.A.). And see S.M. Waddams, "Contracts -
Mistake - Rectification with Optional Rescission" (1975), 53 Can. Bar Rev. 339.
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one party is or ought to be aware that the other party is mistaken as
to the content or terms of the agreement, the mistaken party may be
entitled to rectify the agreement, provided that the non-mistaken
party will have the opportunity to rescind the agreement if that party
would prefer not to go forward on the basis of the other party's
terms. In this fashion, neither party is forced into an agreement to
which they did not freely consent. The Great Peace, by creating
what is, in effect, an absolute bar to the granting of relief of this kind
in common assumption cases appears to have inflicted a further
injury on the English law of mistaken assumptions.
4. The Call for Statutory Reform
By restoring the law of mistaken assumptions more or less to the
account offered by Lord Atkin in Bell v. Lever Brothers, it is
argued here that the English law has been restored to an unsatis-
factory state. It may therefore be considered to be the crowning
irony of the judgment in The Great Peace that the Court of Appeal
itself appears to concede the force of Denning L.J.'s reservations
concerning the common law doctrine articulated in that case.
Having jettisoned Denning L.J.'s attempted improvements of the
doctrine, Lord Phillips observed as follows:
We can understand why the decision in Bell v. Lever Bros Ltd. did not find
favour with Denning L.J. An equitable jurisdiction to grant rescission on
terms where a common fundamental mistake has induced a contract gives
greater flexibility than a doctrine of common law which holds the contract
void in such circumstances. Just as the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts)
Act 1943 was needed to temper the effect of the common law doctrine of
frustration, so there is scope for legislation to give greater flexibility to our
law of mistake than the common law allows.
43
This call for legislative reform to give the doctrine greater flexi-
bility, on the heels of a determination that the flexibility afforded by
equitable mistake doctrine is a "chimera", appears unhelpful for a
number of reasons. First, it is very likely that any legislative reform
that might be contemplated would simply give statutory expression
to the basic approach in Solle v. Butcher that common mistaken
assumptions should give rise only to the remedy of equitable
rescission rather than to voidness at common law.'" Second, it may
143. Supra, footnote 5, at p. 730.
144. See, e.g., Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law of
Contract (Toronto, Ministry of the Attorney General, 1987), at pp. 264-67.
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be questioned whether the legislature is the ideal instrument for
refashioning as subtle and complex an area of private law doctrine
as the law of mistaken assumptions. It is at least a possible view of
the division of responsibility between the legislature and the judici-
ary that the latter is, as a general matter, the appropriate instrument
for the gradual refinement and modification of common law doctrine
that is a hallmark of the common law system.
Be that as it may, from a Canadian perspective, a call for statu-
tory reform of the law of mistaken assumptions is particularly
unrealistic. With nine common law provinces, virtually none of
which manifests substantial interest in legislative reform of the
details of the private law of obligations,'45 it is unrealistic to expect
that all or, indeed, any of the provinces would address legislation
to the resolution of these complex doctrinal difficulties.
5. Matters of Precedent and the Role of the Court of Appeal
Two aspects of the Court of Appeal's handling of the doctrine of
precedent in The Great Peace appear to be contentious. First, the
court's account of Bell v. Lever Brothers appears designed to lead
one to the conclusion that it had little choice but to sweep aside the
pronouncements of Denning L.J. in Solle v. Butcher and restore
the law to the position advanced by Lord Atkin in Bell. With
respect, this is somewhat misleading. While it is fair to suggest
that Lord Atkin's views appeared to enjoy general support of the
three-member majority in Bell v. Lever Brothers, it was nonethe-
less the case that Lord Thankerton"'4 expressed the rule in slightly
different terms than did Lord Atkin, that Lord Blanesburgh'47 was
content to decide the case on a pleading point and, further, that
Lord Atkin' s himself introduced sufficient ambiguity into the dis-
cussion of the test for mistake that it would be an exaggeration to
suggest that it serves as a model of clarity. Accordingly, it is surely
not the case that subsequent courts are driven as a matter of tech-
nical necessity by the doctrine of stare decisis to conclude that the
law was as laid down by Lord Atkin in that case.
145. There are, of course, occasional interventions - see, e.g., Law Reform Act, S.N.B.
1993, c. L-1.2, s. 4 (overruling the doctrine of privity of contract) - but these excep-
tions merely prove the rule that legislative reform across the provinces on matters of
private law doctrine is simply not a realistic option.
146. See the text at footnote 42.
147. See the text at footnote 43.
148. See the text at footnotes 32-41.
[Vol. 40
Mistaken Assumptions in Equity 83
Moreover, although Denning L.J. was candid about his desire to
curtail, if not reverse, the expansion of common law doctrines in this
area, 49 his suggestion that when parties agree on the same terms on
the same subject-matter that the contract is enforceable at common
law is not so far removed from Lord Atkin's suggestion that the com-
mon law doctrine was limited to cases where the mistake leads to a
change in the nature of the subject-matter as to be beyond the pale.
One could, in other words, as other Court of Appeal judges have
done in recent years, simply accept the existence of the equitable
doctrine without doing great violence to the fabric of the common
law method. The Court of Appeal had a choice to make in The Great
Peace, a choice that was not driven by the mechanics of the doctrine
of precedent. To be sure, the Court of Appeal expressly made that
choice on the basis that, in its view, the equitable doctrine had
proven itself to be unsatisfactory and, of course, reasonable persons
can differ as to whether or not reversion to the common law doc-
trine of Lord Atkin is an improvement of the doctrine. Nonetheless,
it is disappointing that so little emphasis appears to have been
placed in the reasoning of the court on the policy considerations
favouring different versions of the common mistake doctrine.
Secondly, it is not entirely clear that the Court of Appeal was cor-
rect in taking the view that it was free to disregard its own previous
decisions applying the doctrine in Solle v. Butcher S.B. Midwinter
has argued persuasively that careful examination of the jurispru-
dence of the Court of Appeal would suggest the court was not free
to do so.'1° Whether or not the Court of Appeal should assert a juris-
diction to depart from its own previous decisions is, of course,
another matter.5 Again, however, if the court had been minded to
simply acquiesce in the existence of the equitable doctrine, the doc-
trine of precedent may well have provided an additional reason for
so doing.
Related to these two concerns is a larger concern about the Court
of Appeal's sense of its role in the common law's continuing exer-
cise in doctrinal reform. Lord Denning had a clear, if controversial,
view of the importance of this aspect of an appellate court's man-
date during his tenure on the Court of Appeal. 5 2 And while, of
149. Supra, footnote 4, at pp. 690-9 1.
150. S.B. Midwinter, "The Great Peace and Precedent" (2003), 119 L.Q.R. 180.
151. See, generally, R. Cross and J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law, 4th ed. (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 108-16.
152. Ibid., at p. 109.
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course, it is the ultimate court of appeal, the House of Lords, that
must assert such leadership as it considers appropriate in matters of
this kind, so few cases eventually make their way to the ultimate
appellate tribunal in any particular jurisdiction, that it would be
unfortunate, in my view, if the intermediate court of appeal
assumed little or virtually no responsibility for engaging in this
process. It would be both inappropriate and unfair to assume from
the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in The Great Peace that it has
adopted an unduly restrictive view of its own participation in
jurisprudential development. On the other hand, the decision does
suggest the possibility, at least, that the Court of Appeal may have
adopted an unduly cramped vision of its role as an appellate court.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Great Peace. As Sir Otto Kahn-Freund is alleged to have
said of The Halley - that flawed classic of English conflicts
jurisprudence - "Oh, how I wish that ship had never set sail!" '153
It is no easy matter, of course, to craft rules that will effectively
reconcile the need for contractual stability and the desirability of
relieving for fundamental error in the context of mistaken assump-
tions cases. Such cases arise only infrequently. The history of the
doctrine is arcane and complex. The decision to grant or withhold
relief in particular circumstances may be subtle and difficult. On the
other hand, American experience demonstrates that it is possible to
speak more plainly about these issues than has the traditional
English doctrine."4 In The Great Peace,' the Court of Appeal was
afforded an opportunity to either reshape mistaken assumptions
doctrine in a constructive way or, more simply, to leave it alone.
Unfortunately, the court of chose the path of restoring the doctrine
to the unsatisfactory state of the law articulated by Lord Atkin in
Bell v. Lever Brothers. Indeed, the Court of Appeal itself acknowl-
edged the unsatisfactory state of the law in that form and called
upon the legislature to engage in statutory reform of the law of
mistaken assumptions.
As a matter of precedent, it should be emphasized that the
lengthy analysis of equitable mistake doctrine offered by the Court
153. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Reuben Hasson, a former student of Kahn-
Freund, for this illustration of Kahn-Freund's classroom charm.
154. See the text at footnotes 63-72.
155. Supra, footnote 5.
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of Appeal in The Great Peace does not appear to be necessary to
the decision. As the court itself notes,'56 analysis of a mistaken
assumptions case should begin with a careful construction of the
agreement in order to determine whether the risk of the error that
has occurred has been assigned by the agreement to one of the par-
ties. As indicated above, when one undertakes such an analysis of
the agreement in The Great Peace, one is drawn to the conclusion
that the stipulation of a termination fee of a few days' hire
assigned the risk of early termination to the hirer. It was thus
unnecessary to consider whether the agreement, though valid at
law, was voidable in equity. Indeed, the Court of Appeal does not
give a clear indication of its view as to whether, if the equitable
doctrine existed, it would embrace these particular facts. Thus, it
is not at all clear that the court believed that it had before it a case
where the equitable doctrine, if it existed, would apply. If it was
not such a case, the discussion of the very existence of the equi-
table doctrine is not necessary to the decision. Whether or not The
Great Peace stands as good authority on the state of English law,
however, it does not, of course, constitute an authoritative statement
of Canadian common law.
The reader will not be surprised by my conclusion that it would
be most unfortunate indeed if Canadian courts were to embrace the
reasoning of the Court of Appeal in The Great Peace. Canadian
courts'57 have welcomed Solle v. Butcher into the fabric of Canadian
mistake doctrine and, in so doing, have, in my view, much
improved upon the law as articulated by Lord Atkin in the Bell
case. Moreover, the Court of Appeal's call for legislative reform'58
is particularly unrealistic in the Canadian context. It is unlikely,
surely, that any province will take up the task of reforming the law
of mistaken assumptions. The most optimistic prognosis would be
that a few provinces might do so, with resulting complexity and
inconsistency in a patchwork of reform and non-reform across the
common law provinces. In short, Canadian courts would be wise to
retain the equitable jurisdiction to treat contracts as voidable on the
basis of mistaken assumptions. Canadian courts minded to improve
the doctrine will find helpful guidance, in my view, in the more
coherent and rational doctrine that has developed in the American
156. See the discussion in the text at footnotes 78-81 and 126-30.
157. See the discussion in the text at footnotes 83-87.
158. See the discussion in the text at footnotes 143-45.
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jurisprudence on these issues.'59 The recognition signalled in The
Great Peace of the importance of risk allocation analysis in this
context is, indeed, a useful and important step in this direction.
Courts less attracted by the American model would be well
advised, I suggest, to simply leave the Canadian law of mistaken
assumptions in its current state.
159. See the discussion in the text at footnotes 63-72.
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